I investigate whether financial openness leads to financial development after controlling for the level of legal/institutional development, and whether trade opening is a precondition for financial opening, focusing on Asia. Utilizing a panel encompassing 87 less developed countries over the period 1980 to 2000, I find that a higher level of financial openness spurs equity market development only if a threshold level of legal development has been attained, a condition prevalent particularly among emerging market Asian countries. On the issue of sequencing, trade openness is found to be a prerequisite for successful inducement of financial development via capital account liberalization.
Introduction
The Asian crisis of 1997-98 confronted policy makers with the conundrum of financial globalization. While more open financial markets can contribute to economic development, it is the openness of financial markets that can make developing countries more vulnerable to financial disruptions (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001a ,b, 2002 and Schmukler 2003 . 1 Despite the experience of the 1990's, East Asian policy makers do not appear to have abandoned the path of financial liberalization. Rather, as is best exemplified by the Chiang Mai Initiative, they have re-emphasized economic development through more integrated financial markets in the region. The progress in financial development has occurred against a backdrop of regional trade arrangements. As Pomfret (2005) documents, the Asian currency union also started being discussed in the region, signifying the importance of how to sequence liberalization policies.
2 In sum, the debate is not whether to liberalize, but that of how to liberalize. This study attempts to inform that debate.
A common view is that capital account liberalization leads to the development of financial markets that channel funds to borrowers with the most productive investment opportunities. Theory suggests several mechanisms for this occurrence. First, financial liberalization may mitigate financial repression in protected financial markets, allowing the real interest rate to rise to its competitive market equilibrium (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) . Second, the removal of capital controls allows domestic and foreign investors to engage in more portfolio diversification, thereby reducing the cost of capital, and increasing the availability of funds. 4 Third, and not least, the liberalization process usually increases the efficiency of the financial system by weeding out inefficient financial institutions and creating greater pressure for a reform of the financial infrastructure, alleviating information asymmetry issues such as adverse selection and moral 1 In this study I do not discuss the merits of capital controls in the context of financial crises. For a review, see Aizenman (2002) . Kletzer and Mody (2000) survey the debate in the context of "self-protection policies" for emerging markets. Ito (2004) investigates the correlation between financial liberalization and the output performance of crisis-hit economies. 2 See Eichengreen (2004) for the arguments about the ingredients for the Asian currency union. 3 See for instance Leahy, et al. (2001) for OECD-specific results. Klein and Olivei (2001) document the linkage between financial development and economic growth for developed countries, and its absence for less developed countries. Spiegel (2001) examines an APEC sample, while Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) document the fragility of many of these group-specific results. IMF (2001, Chapter 4) surveys both the growth and finance, and finance and liberalization literatures. For the most recent review on finance and growth, refer to Quinn, et al. (2002) 4 See Shultz (1999), Henry (2000) , and Bekaert et al.(2000 Bekaert et al.( , 2001 .
hazard (Claesens et al., 2001; Stulz, 1999; Stiglitz 2000) .
The link between financial liberalization and financial development is not unambiguous, however. One common argument is that to benefit from more open cross-border financial transactions, financial systems need to be equipped with reasonable legal and institutional infrastructure. 5 Specifically, in economies where the legal system does not clearly define property rights or guarantee the enforcement of contracts, the incentives for loan activities can be limited.
Legal protections for creditors and the level of credibility and transparency of accounting rules are also likely to affect economic agents' financial decisions. 6 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter LLSV, 1997 LLSV, , 1998 and Levine (1998 Levine ( , 2002 show that low levels of shareholder rights are associated with poorly developed equity markets (especially in French civil law countries), while Claessens, et al. (2002) and Caprio, et al. (2004) find that greater creditor rights are positively associated with financial intermediary development.
The ambiguity can be empirically reconciled by incorporating explicitly the level of legal and institutional development. I hypothesize that financial liberalization can lead to financial development only if the economic system is equipped with a reasonable level of legal and institutional development.
In this paper, I also examine another oft-discussed issue related to the sequence of liberalization, that is, the order of liberalization in goods and financial markets. The prominent work by McKinnon (1991) argues that liberalization in the trade sector must precede liberalization in the capital account transactions. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that financial liberalization can lead to financial development only when the economy is open in both cross-border trade and capital flows because the economic openness can lead to weakening the political power of incumbent financial institutions to oppose further financial development. Aizenman and Noy (2004) , while investigating countries' motivations for capital controls, find that financial openness and trade openness are bidirectional though the causality from the former to the latter is found to be more pervasive than the other. Given the ongoing debates over the manner in which to implement financial and real integration in Asia, I think this question is of central importance.
This paper conducts a panel data analysis using the dataset encompassing 87 developing and emerging market countries (including 15 Asian countries) and twenty years ranging from 1980 to 2000. In the econometric analysis, I pay special attention to financial development in the equity market sector and attempt to highlight any special attributes of the Asian region.
The empirical results suggest that a higher level of financial openness contributes to the development of equity markets, but only if a country is equipped with a certain level of legal and institutional development. This finding is applicable not only to the group of less developed countries in general, but also to that of the Asian economies. It can be further surmised that many of the Asian emerging market countries have been more successful in reaping the benefits of financial liberalization because of their relatively higher levels of legal and institutional development. Higher levels of bureaucratic quality, and of law and order, as well as the lower levels of corruption, have enhanced the effects of financial opening in fostering the development of equity markets for less developed countries in general, while only the absence of corruption and a high index of law and order matter for the Asian countries. As for the issue of the sequencing, the liberalization in cross-border goods transactions is found to be a precondition for capital account liberalization among all the sample groups. When the endogeneity of financial openness is accounted for using trade openness as an instrument, it is confirmed that financial liberalization leads to financial development.
Overview of Financial Development and Financial Openness in Asia
First, I take an overview of the development of financial markets in less developed countries, focusing on the Asian economies. Drawing on the work of Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) , I use the following four financial development variables (FD). PCGDP, the ratio of private credit from deposit money banks to the private sector, represents the overall development in private banking markets. While this variable is examined for purposes of comparison, the primary focus is placed on the development of equity markets development, for which three variables are used as the measures:
SMKC (stock market capitalization), SMTV (total value of stocks traded), and SMTO (stock market turn over ratio). SMKC can be considered as the measure of the size of equity markets and SMTV and SMTO as the measure of the activeness of equity markets. show that the Asian region historically achieved high level of financial development compared to other less developed countries. In fact, these countries' financial development has been as rigorous as industrialized countries in both banking and equity markets development. Also, its achievement during the 1990s is remarkable despite the Asian financial crisis. (SMTV and SMTO) . This is true despite the retrenchment in the equity markets of less developed and emerging market countries during the second half of the decade.
Again, despite the crisis, the speed of Asian financial development in recent years is striking.
Financial Openness in Asia
In this paper, the extent of financial openness is measured using the capital account openness index, KAOPEN developed by Chinn and Ito (2002) . Many researchers have used binary variables based upon the IMF's categorical enumeration reported in Annual Report on Exchange 8 In this study, I do not look into offshore markets as part of financial development, and therefore, focus merely on the development of domestic equity markets. Although we have witnessed that some Asian emerging market countries such as Korea and Thailand tried to complement their domestic markets by developing offshore markets and allowing foreign investors, mostly hedge funds, to actively engage, there have not developed so much literature regarding these issues, mainly owing to the recentness of the development of hedge funds and offshore markets (except for Fung and Hsieh, 2001; Brown and Goetzmann, 2001; and Brown et al., 1998) . Furthermore, the relationship between onshore and offshore funds has not been rigorously investigated (except for Kim and Wei, 2002) due to data unavailability.
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)
9 and others such as Quinn (1997) and Miniane (2004) have created more delicate measures. 10 However, the consensus is that such measures fail to fully capture the complexity of real-world capital controls. 11 KAOPEN is the first principle component of the four IMF binary variables, and higher values indicate greater financial openness.
One of the merits of the KAOPEN index is that it attempts to measure the intensity of capital controls, insofar as the intensity is correlated with the existence of other restrictions on international transactions. One may argue that the KAOPEN index measures the extensity of capital controls because it may not directly refer to the stringency of restrictions on cross-border transactions, but to the existence of different types of restrictions. However, measuring the extensity of capital controls may be a good proxy to the measure of intensity of capital controls.
For example, considering that transactions on the current account have often been used to evade capital account controls (Edwards, 1999) , policy makers can increase the stringency of capital controls by tightening transactions on the current account restrictions or other systems such as multiple exchange rates and requirements to surrender export proceeds. Another merit of this index is its wide coverage (more than 100 countries) for a long time period (1970 through 2000) .
Appendix 2 explains with more details how KAOPEN is constructed.
One more note must be made about this index. By the nature of its construction, this index is considered to be de jure measures on financial openness because it attempts to measure regulatory restrictions on capital account transactions. Hence, this index is different from price-based measures on financial openness, namely those based on the interest rate parity (UIP or 9 These binary variables are created based on a set of "on-off" clarification, which includes an indicator variable for the existence of multiple exchange rates (k 1 ); restrictions on current account (k 2 ); capital account transactions (k 3 ); and a variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k 4 ). k 3 is the one often used for capital controls. In 1996, the classification method in the AREAER changed and these four categories became more disaggregated as an effort to reflect the complexity of capital controls policies. 10 The Quinn index is a composite measure of financial regulation and based upon Quinn's coding of the qualitative information contained in the AREAER pertaining to k 2 and k 3 , augmented by information regarding whether the country in question has entered into international agreements with international organizations such as the OECD and EU. The Quinn index is available for the OECD members between 1958 and 1997, but the coverage for the less developed countries is limited to certain years (1958, 1973, 1982, 1988, and 1997) . Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) created the time series of capital controls based on the recently created disaggregate components in the AREAER. However, the time series of the variables only covers years after 1996. Most recently, Miniane (2004) constructed a set of indices to measure the intensity of capital controls, based on an approach akin to Johnston et al., but extending the data back to 1983 for 34 countries. 11 See Edison and Warnock (2001) , Edwards (2001) , and Edison et al. (2002) for discussions and comparisons of RIP) approach such as Cheung, et al. (2003) and Montiel (1995) or those on deviations from no arbitrage profits conditions such as De Gregorio (1998). Researchers often refer to these price-based measures as de facto measures on financial integration. These two types of financial openness measures have their own strengths and weaknesses. 12 However, it is almost impossible not only to rank the supremacy of these measures, but also to distinguish them. Nonetheless, this paper focuses on regulatory aspects of capital account openness. 
An Econometric Analysis
In what follows, I investigate the issues relevant to the sequence of liberalization.
The Empirical Specification
First, I will examine the long-term effect of capital account openness on financial development in a model that controls for the level of legal and institutional development. The model is specified as:
where FD is a measure of financial development; KAOPEN is a measure of financial openness; X various measures on capital restrictions. 12 One of the drawbacks of de jure measures on financial openness is that as Edwards (1999) discusses, it is often the case that the private sector circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital controls, which can be captured by price-based measures. A drawback of the price-based measures, on the other hand, is the measures, especially those based on the interest rate parity conditions, can reflect changes in macroeconomic conditions even if there is no regulatory changes on capital account transactions. For categorization of measures on financial integration and/or financial openness, refer to Cavoli, et al. (2003) and Takagi and Hirose (2004) .
is a vector of economic control variables; and L i refers to a measure of legal or institutional development.
The vector X contains macroeconomic control variables that include log per capita income in PPP terms, the inflation rate, and trade openness, measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. In this analysis, the set is kept fairly small so as to retain some interpretability of the correlations. Log per capita income is included as there is a long literature ascribing financial deepening, aside from the role of regulation, to the increasig complexity of economic structures associated with rising income. The inflation rate is included because it may distort decisionmaking. 13 In particular, moderate to high inflation may discourage financial intermediation, and encourage saving in real assets. Finally, trade openness is included as an ad hoc control; many empirical studies find a correlation of trade openness with any number of economic variables. The relationship between trade openness and financial openness will be investigated more thoroughly in a later section.
A series of regressions is conducted for each of the four financial development variables 
The Data
13 Since in most cases, the volatility of inflation rises with the inflation rate, the inflation rate could be proxying for either or both of these effects. 14 Time fixed effects are also included in the model to control for possible time-specific exogenous shocks.
The data are originally recorded at an annual frequency, over the 1970-2000 period, covering 108 countries and drawn from a number of sources, primarily the World Bank's World Development Indicators, the IMF's International Financial Statistics, and the databases associated with Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) .
Measures of Legal/Institutional Development
The legal/institutional variables used in this study contain the measures related to the general development of legal systems and institutions, namely LEGAL1, Corrupt, LAO, and BQ.
LEGAL1 is the first principal component of the other three variables, and this variable is treated as a representative measure of the general level of legal/institutional development. 15 Corrupt, LAO,
and BQ measure the level of corruption, law and order, and the quality of the bureaucratic system, respectively. All of these data series included in LEGAL1 are obtained from the ICRG database. In these indexes, higher values indicate better conditions. The data series are available for the period of 1984 through 1997, but are included as the period-average.
Before discussing the regression results, I make one observation. In the following panel data analyses, the data on legal/institutional development are cross-sectional in nature, i.e., they are time-invariant. The relative shortness of the time series of the ICRG variables makes it difficult to include these variables as panel data. As Wei (2000) discusses (on the corruption indices in his paper), these types of institutional variables may entail some possibility of biasness. In order to circumvent this issue, it is reasonable to use the period average. Also, the inclusion of these variables as time-invariant factors should not pose a substantial problem for this study, since these characteristics represented by the legal/institutional variables are likely to change only very slowly. 16 Moreover, I focus mainly on the effect of financial openness on financial development, but not the effect of legal/institutional development per se. In other words, rather than shedding light on how the development of institutions and legal systems affects financial development, I
examine how the effect of financial openness changes depending upon the "environment" of 15 The first eigenvector for Legal1 was found to be (Corrupt, LAO,BQ)' = (0.574, 0.580, 0.578)', indicating that the variability of LEGAL1 is not merely driven by any particular series.
16 Stulz (1999) and Stiglitz (2000) argue that financial globalization puts pressure on governments to improve legal systems and infrastructure for financial markets. However, to my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence for the causality.
institutions and legal systems. Therefore, time-variation of the legal/institutional variables is not critical to this study.
Empirical Results
The regression results for the model specified in equation (1) are reported in Tables 3-1 when financial development is measured by stock market total values, financial openness (KAOPEN t-5 ) contributes both directly and in an interactive manner with legal and institutional development to equity market development. In both the Asian and non-Asian LDC samples, the interactive effect between financial openness and legal development is detected. Significant coefficients for the interactive term are also found in the models with equity market development measured by stock market turnover for LDC and non-Asian LDC subsamples (not reported).
Here, one must be careful about how to interpret the overall effect of capital account openness because it depends on the level of legal development. 18 That is, given equation (1), the total effect of financial openness can be shown as:
where L is the mean of a measure of legal development. For example, when one examines the regression specifications for the financial development measured in stock market total value for LDC group in Table 3 -1 (column [7] ), the total effect of a one-unit increase in KAOPEN is calculated to be -0.06 percent point using the LDC group's average of LEGAL1, -0.74. If the same calculation is conducted for the Asian group using the same coefficients from column [7] but the group's average of LEGAL1, -0.45, the total effect is now 0.24 percent point because the Asian group's average of LEGAL1 is higher than LDC's. Thus, opening capital accounts can lead to a lower or higher rate of development in equity markets, depending upon the level of legal and institutional development. . Row [C] shows the threshold level of the legal variable, above which a one-unit increase in capital account openness has a positive impact on equity market development. The table illustrates that, in order for capital account openness to contribute to the development of equity markets, countries must be possessed of a level of legal/institutional development greater than the threshold level of LEGAL1 = -0.68. Hence, among the sample groups, the groups of emerging market countries, Asian economies, and Asian emerging market countries (whose average values of LEGAL1 exceed the -0.68 threshold) will on average benefit from opening their capital accounts. On the other hand, less developed countries, non-Asian LDC, and the Latin American group will hamper their equity market development by opening capital accounts. Especially, the negative effect of financial opening on the Latin American group is significant because of the low level of legal and institutional development. The Asian emerging market countries, on the other hand, can develop equity markets considerably by opening their capital accounts.
As specific examples, Peru increased its financial openness from -1.84 to 2.27 between 1990 and 1995. Given its LEGAL1 level of -1.65, much lower than the threshold of -0.68, the increase in financial openness would reduce the growth rate of stock market total value by 4.1% point annually. Thailand, on the other hand, experienced a smaller increase of 1.10 in its KAOPEN variable (from 0.15 to 1.25), but because its LEGAL1 level is 0.39, much higher than the threshold as well as Peru's, its SMTV is predicted to grow at an additional 1.2% annually. Given that SMTV grew at 1.99% annually for less developed countries during the 1990s (Table 1) , this acceleration in the growth rate is significant. significant for the models with Corrupt and LAO (and adjusted R-squares are relatively higher than other subgroups). Bureaucratic quality seems to matter for non-Asian less developed countries, but not for the Asian countries. Interestingly, the coefficient of KAOPEN t-5 alone has a negative sign wherever the interactive term has a significant coefficient, suggesting that opening financial markets alone may lead to underdevelopment of equity markets, but it can be avoided only if the countries are equipped with a reasonable level of legal/institutional development. Table 4 , again, helps the interpretation of the overall effect of KAOPEN for the models with SMTV. Generally, liberalizing capital accounts lead to development in equity markets only when the measures against corruption or law and order are higher than the threshold levels (52.2 and 54.5, respectively). When the level of bureaucratic quality is controlled for, financial openness seems to leads to financial development among all subgroups except for Latin America. For the Asian subgroup (column [4] ), it appears that only the average level of bureaucracy quality is high enough for the countries in this group to reap from financial liberalization while that is not the case with the levels of anti-corruption and law and order. However, as far as Asian emerging market countries are concerned, all of these countries' levels of anti-corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality are high enough for them to benefit from financial liberalization. As such, I
can conclude that it is the relatively higher levels of legal and institutional infrastructure that allow Asian countries, especially Asian emerging market countries, to reap the benefit from financial liberalization and develop their equity markets. This result is consistent with the observations from Tables 1 and 2 .
The same exercise is repeated using a different set of legal and institutional variables. The new variables pertain particularly to financial transactions, namely, creditor protection (CREDITOR), contract enforcement (ENFORCE), shareholder protection (SHRIGHTS), and the accounting standards (ACCOUNT), all of which are obtained from LLSV (1997, 1998) . I also constructed a composite index LEGAL2 which is the first standardized principal component of the four variables, and therefore depicts the overall development of the legal system governing financial transactions. The regressions using LEGAL2 as the legal/institutional variable yield qualitatively the same results as those with LEGAL1. However, the results for the models with each of the four LLSV variables included as the legal variable are not as decisive as in the previous cases (not reported). 20 These findings suggest that it is the development of general legal systems and institutions, not of those specific to financial transactions, that is crucial for a country to benefit from opening its capital accounts.
Robustness Checks
The above results are obtained from the estimation of a set of non-overlapping five-year panels, which has a merit of mitigating endogeneity problems. In addition, this estimation method has other advantages. First, it serves to minimize the effect of correlations due to business cycle fluctuations because it samples observations data every five years. Second, for the same reason, the use of five-year windows allows one to minimize (but does not completely solve) the effect of financial bubbles the financial development indicators may unintentionally capture. As a point of reference, it is useful to note that in many studies of lending booms as financial crises indicators, changes in lending or stock market sizes over a shorter window, of between 2 to 4 years are, often used. 21 However, the choice of five years as the length of each window is still arbitrary. Hence, I
conduct a series of robustness checks regarding the panel windows. In order to conserve space, I
only summarize the results below.
First of all, I checked whether the estimation results are specific to the years from which data are sampled, i.e. , 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 . I reran the regressions using the non-overlapping data from the years one year before or after the above years (i.e., every five years starting in 1979 or 1981). The estimation results are found to be qualitatively unchanged. Second, I changed the length of the panel intervals. When the length of the windows is changed to four years as well as six years, the estimation results are qualitatively intact, though the estimation results become stronger in terms of the key coefficients' magnitude and significance when the length is changed to six years.
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I also examined whether the above baseline results are sensitive to outliers. It is important to check the impact of outliers because the data on financial development can be subject to financial bubbles as previously discussed, and also because they can involve some measurement errors.
First, using the original annual data, I exclude the observations of financial development variables if their annual growth rates are two standard deviations away from the mean in both directions, and re-estimate the same sets of regressions. 23 Generally, in the re-estimated results (not reported), the magnitude of the estimated coefficients often becomes smaller, but so do the standard errors, especially for the models with stock market related measures. Therefore, not only does the statistical significance of the coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged, but in addition some of 21 See Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Chinn, Dooley and Shrestha (1999) , Kaminsky (2003) , Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) , Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001b) , and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) . 22 I also conducted the robustness checks by changing the length of the window for the SHARE variable (see Appendix 2) in the same way as that of the panel windows. When a new KAOPEN variable is calculated using a four-year or three-year window for the SHARE variable are used, the estimation results are found to be qualitatively fairly unaffected. When both the length of the window for the SHARE variable and the length of panel windows are changed in the same way, as long as the change is to either four or six years, the results did not change. 23 This exercise was conducted only for the sample of less developed countries because the subsamples are small in the first place. The exclusion of outliers shrinks the sample size by about 0 -11% and takes place more for the models with stock market total value and stock market turnover than those with private credit creation and stock market capitalization, which reflects that the former group are more subject to market volatility than the latter.
the coefficients which were previously insignificant become significant. Interestingly, in many models the adjusted R-squared increases. 24 These results allow me to conclude that the key findings of the analysis are not driven by outliers, and also that some of the findings related to the legal/institutional variables could have even been obscured by the effects of outliers.
3. To explore the above question, I change the specification in equation (1) that a rapid growth in equity markets, in terms of the size of the markets (SMKC) or the liquidity of the markets (SMTV or SMTO) is sometimes associated with financial crises, and that policy makers lower the degree of financial openness during periods of crisis (Ito, 2004) . At the very least, I can conclude that the baseline estimation results are not subject to obvious simultaneity issues (as in Bekaert, et al., 2001 ).
Investigating the Sequence of Liberalization

Trade and Capital Account Liberalization
The next question is whether trade openness is a precondition for financial opening. This is the optimal sequence question, which has been raised by many, including, most notably,
McKinnon (1991). According to McKinnon's hypothesis, liberalizing capital accounts is the last step of economic liberalization and must be implemented only if trade openness is achieved.
Although this hypothesis has been influential, empirical evidence has been mixed. Haggard and Maxfield (1993) shows that trade openness is a precondition for removing capital controls whereas Leblang (1997) does not find any evidence for the influence from trade openness on capital account liberalization. Aizenman and Noy (2004) find that financial openness and trade openness are bidirectional, though financial openness seems to lead to trade openness more than the other way around. Tornell et al. (2004) also show that financial liberalization has typically followed trade liberalization over the last two decades.
Recently, the sequencing issue is getting more attention in the Asian region because of the efforts for regional economic integration. 25 The empirical model also controls for regional differences by regional dummies. 26 The variable for gross international reserves is a proxy to the balance of payments situation of the countries and is measured by gross international reserves in months of imports. The lower gross reserves in months of imports, the higher prevalence of balance of payments concerns are. The data are extracted from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. 27 Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) show that capital controls have strong fiscal implications, i.e., countries with a less developed tax system tend to implement capital controls as the source of government revenue as well as the remedy to capital flows caused by the inflation-driven distortions in the financial markets. Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) find that countries tend to implement capital controls, the more prevalent the balance of payments concerns are. For more discussion of the macroeconomic determinants of capital controls, refer to Leblang (1997) . 28 In addition to the above variables, I included variables that refer to the government engagement in seigniorage, such as the inflation rate or the reserve ratio. However, these measures of seigniorage can cause multicollinearity in regression analysis due to its correlation with the level of government budget surplus, the reverse of which is often the reason for seigniorage. Therefore, I decided not to include seigniorage-related variables in the regression model. Because the analysis in this subsection also functions as a preliminary analysis for the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation in the next subsection, I maintain the estimation model as parsimonious as possible. 29 Import and export duties as a ratio to imports and exports, respectively, are available from the World Bank's WDI. The higher (or close to 100) TRADEOPEN is, the less duties imposed on trade flows in both directions, i.e., the more I also test whether the reverse causality, i.e., financial openness leads to trade openness, holds. To maintain the parsimony of the model, the places for KAOPEN and TRADEOPEN in equation (3) The first three columns of Table 6 report the results for the regressions on whether trade openness leads to financial openness. While the average budget surplus and GDP per capita enter significantly, but not international reserves, the trade openness variable seems to significantly contribute to the level of financial openness in all sample groups, indicating that the openness in goods transactions is a precondition for financial openness. Interestingly, when the same exercise is repeated for the group of Latin American countries (not reported), the coefficient of the trade openness variable becomes insignificant with a large drop in the p-value.
Columns (4) through (6) of Table 6 show the results on whether the reverse causality also holds. In all the samples, the financial openness variable does not enter significantly. Hence, I can safely conclude that the more openness in goods transactions can lead to a more openness in capital account, but the reverse causality does not appear to be present.
Endogeneity and the Sequence of Liberalization
Taking a cue from the results reported above, I implement two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation instrumenting the KAOPEN t-5 variable in equation (1) government budget surplus and GDP per capita as the five-year average prior to t-5 and regional dummies.
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The results of applying 2SLS to a model that controls for the general development level of legal systems and institutions (LEGAL1) are reported in Table 7 . For the model with stock market total value (SMTV) of the group of less developed countries, we can see that both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients for the level KAOPEN, LEGAL1, and interactive terms increase. For the Asian sample, the interactive term remains significant while the level KAOPEN term does not (the p-value is 29%). For the SMKC models, the level of financial openness becomes significant contributors to equity market development for both the LDC and Asian groups. Given these results, we may conclude that financial opening succeeding trading opening leads to equity market development especially when it takes place in an economy with a reasonably developed legal system. This conclusion is applicable to the Asian sample with a somewhat lesser degree. i.e., trade openness should precede financial openness. 30 The international reserves variable is not included because of its insignificance in the previous analysis. The regional dummies are not included as IVs for the Asia and non-Asian LDC subsamples.
Concluding Remarks
On the first point, the empirical results suggest that financial openness does contribute to equity market development -measured as activity of the stock market -but only when a threshold level of general development of legal systems and institutions has been attained, a condition which is more prevalent among Asian countries, especially emerging market Asian countries, than among the entire set of developing countries. 31 When the specific effects of legal/institutional development are examined, a higher level of bureaucratic quality and law and order, as well as a lower level of corruption, are found to enhance the effect of financial opening in fostering the development of equity markets. For the Asian set of countries, corruption and law and order appear to matter for equity market development while the quality of bureaucracy does not. Interestingly, finance-specific legal institutions do not seem to fulfill the same role, indicating that the general level of legal development matters more than the level of finance-specific legal/institutional development. These results are robust to the presence of outliers in the data and simultaneity as well as to different model specifications, so I conclude that increasing the level of openness in cross-border financial transactions -when a reasonable level of legal and institutional development is achieved -can lead to development in equity markets.
On the McKinnon hypothesis, the opening of goods markets is found to be a precondition for financial opening in less developed sample as well as the Asian subsample. However, the reverse causal link does not hold for any of the sample groups. When the financial openness variable is instrumented with trade openness, the contribution of the general level of legal development still remains significant for the group of less developed countries and with a somewhat lesser degree for the Asian sample. I interpret this finding as evidence that an increase in trade openness is a prolog to financial openness, and thence to financial development.
These findings suggest that the uniquely high level of equity market development in the Asian region can be explained by the policy of financial openness in the presence of a highly developed legal infrastructure as well as trade openness. 
Construction of KAOPEN
KAOPEN is based on the four binary dummy variables reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These variables are to provide information on the extent and nature of the restrictions on external accounts for a wide cross-section of countries. These variables are:
• k 1 : variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates;
• k 2 : variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions;
• k 3 : variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions; and
• k 4 : variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds.
In order to focus on the effect of financial openness -rather than controls -we reverse the values of these binary variables, such that the variables are equal to one when the capital account restrictions are non-existent. Moreover, for controls on capital transitions (k 3 ), we use the share of a five-year window (encompassing year t and the preceding four years) that capital controls were not in effect (SHAREk 3 ).
Then we construct an index for capital "openness" (KAOPEN t ), which is the first standardized principal component of k 1t , k 2t SHAREk 3 , k 4t . 32 This index takes on higher values the more open the country is to cross-border capital transactions. By construction, the series has a mean of zero. The first eigenvector for KAOPEN was found to be (SHAREk 3 , k 1 , k 2 , k 4 )' = (0.573, 0.273, 0.521, 0.571)', indicating that the variability of KAOPEN is not merely driven by the SHAREk 3 series.
We incorporate the k 1,t , k 2,t , and k 4,t variables in our KAOPEN variable instead of focusing on k 3 which refers to restrictions on capital account transactions. We believe the incorporation of k 1,t , k 2,t , and k 4,t in this index allows us to more accurately capture the intensity of the capital controls. This point can be made more concrete by considering a country with an open capital account. It may still restrict the flow of capital by limiting transactions on the current account restrictions or other systems such as multiple exchange rates and requirements to surrender export proceeds. Alternatively, countries that already have closed capital accounts might try to increase the stringency of those controls by imposing k 1 , k 2 , and k 4 types of restrictions so that the private sector cannot circumvent the capital account restrictions.
By the nature of its construction, one may argue that the KAOPEN index measures the extensity of capital controls because it may not directly refer to the stringency of restrictions on cross-border transactions, but to the existence of different types of restrictions. However, measuring the extensity of capital controls may be a good proxy to the measure of intensity of capital controls. One might think of the Quinn (1997) index or the Miniane (2004) index as the measures of the intensity of capital controls. The correlation between the Chinn-Ito index and the Quinn or Miniane index is found to be 83.9% and 80.2%, respectively, suggesting that KAOPEN is proxying the intensity of capital controls.
Clearly, the measurement of the extent of capital account controls is a difficult enterprise. Many researchers have tried to capture the complexity of real-world capital controls, with varying degrees of success, and varying degrees of coverage. For reviews and comparisons of various measures on capital controls, refer to Edwards (2001) , Edison et al. (2002) and Eichengreen (2002) . ). The estimation model is based on equation (1) using the data of the LDC subgroup for the regressions with legal variables (column [7] in Table 3-1) . Rows [C] show the threshold level of the legal variable above which the capital account openness has a positive impact on financial development. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Budget surplus, total reserves, and GDP per capita are included at the average over t-1 through t-5. Constant and regional fix effects (time fixed effects for the Asian sample) are also included in the regression, but their estimated coefficients are not reported. The regression estimations are conducted in non-overlapping manners with the observations excepted for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 excluded. The TRADEOPEN variable is included in log form. S r i L a n k a P a k is t a n P e r u 
